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THE CHILD-WELFARE SYSTEM AND 
THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY 
CLARE HUNTINGTON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
To read Robert Mnookin’s seminal 1975 article, Child-Custody 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,1 is to see a 
blueprint for legislative action. To a remarkable degree, the reforms Mnookin 
proposed to the child-welfare system are what Congress and the states adopted 
in the following two decades. And yet reading Mnookin’s article is also a 
Groundhog Day experience. The problems he described with the child-welfare 
system nearly forty years ago sound all too familiar today.2 
Mnookin famously argued that the best-interests standard was 
indeterminate in the context of the child-welfare system.3 According to 
Mnookin, this open-ended standard created several notable failings: It could 
not identify families truly in need of intervention, it took little account of the 
dangers inherent in foster-care placement, and it did not move children through 
the system expeditiously.4 As a result, too many children were removed from 
their homes unnecessarily and then left to languish in the limbo of foster care.5 
To address these problems, Mnookin proposed a more determinate standard to 
replace the best-interests test. To limit removals to cases where foster-care 
placement was truly needed, he proposed that states remove a child only where 
her physical health was in immediate danger and there were no reasonable 
means available for protecting the child within the family.6 And, to move 
children more quickly through the system, he proposed a time limit on efforts to 
reunify the family.7 
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 1.  39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975). 
 2.  GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993). 
 3.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229. 
 4.  See id. at 268–77. 
 5.  Throughout this article, I use the term “removal” in its general sense to mean the decision to 
take a child from her home and place her in an alternative setting. I do not differentiate among the 
various procedural postures for removing a child. For a description of such various procedural postures, 
see Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child 
Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 457–58 (2003). Chill notes, however, that most children 
are removed on an emergency basis. Id. at 458.  
 6.  See infra text accompanying note 32. 
 7.  See infra Part II.A. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress undertook serious and sustained reforms 
to the legal standards governing the child-welfare system, largely moving in the 
direction Mnookin advocated. In one reform, Congress tried to stem the tide of 
foster-care placement by requiring states to provide family-preservation 
services, intended to keep children in their original homes.8 Although this 
requirement fell short of Mnookin’s determinate standard for removals, it was 
in the same spirit of preventing foster-care placement by treating families with 
children still at home. In a later reform, Congress more fully embraced an 
aspect of Mnookin’s determinate standard, requiring states to adopt a time limit 
on family-reunification efforts.9 
Despite these considerable changes to the standards governing child 
welfare, the reforms have had mixed success in changing actual practice on the 
ground. Determinacy on the front end—accurately identifying which children 
should be removed from their homes—remains challenging, and efforts to focus 
on family preservation have had a very modest impact on keeping children at 
home. We have not fully invested in these programs and doing so is difficult in 
the face of continued resistance to family-preservation efforts. But even with 
additional funding, it is not clear these programs can effectively prevent foster-
care placement. 
By contrast, determinacy on the back end—moving more children out of 
foster care—is easier to achieve. The time limit on reunification efforts has had 
the intended effect of shortening stays in foster care. This determinacy, 
however, has come at a real cost. Fewer children are returning home, and one 
reason children are moving more quickly out of foster care is because they are 
going to adoptive homes and guardianships.10 Whether this trade-off is an 
improvement over the old system, where children spent more time in foster care 
but were also more likely to return home, is a matter of considerable 
controversy. But it is clear that a more expeditious timeline puts considerable 
pressure on parents to make the required changes in time to regain custody. 
Mnookin predicted this problem but believed that a determinate standard 
would, ultimately, create a fairer system that benefitted children.11 The darker 
side of time limits is that more children are now emancipated from foster care, 
neither returning home nor finding a permanent home with an adoptive family 
or a guardian.  
With the evidence on the results of determinacy now in hand, it is time to 
reflect on the possibilities and limits of the child-welfare system.12 Well-
intentioned reforms of the legal standards that govern the child-welfare system 
have done little to address the larger problems that underlie child abuse and 
neglect—particularly poverty, social isolation, substance abuse, and parental 
 
 8.  See infra text accompanying note 50. 
 9.  See infra text accompaying notes 60–63. 
 10.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 11.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 293. 
 12.  See infra Part IV. 
8_HUNTINGTON_EIC (RECOVERED)_JCI (3) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2014  10:37 AM 
No. 1 2014] THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY 223 
stress. By the time a family is ensnared in the system, it is often too late for even 
the most carefully calibrated legal standard to address the crisis that led the 
state to intervene. The emphasis on family preservation has not created a 
system that effectively addresses underlying problems, and indeed any efforts 
that come this late face considerable hurdles. The time limits help move 
children to permanency, but at a substantial cost. 
What the child-welfare system needs is a fundamental reorientation toward 
prevention. Broad-based “family support” programs funded through the child-
welfare system offer a promising model, and it is here that we should place our 
real efforts. And for those children who are removed from their homes—there 
will always be some—the child-welfare system should develop more realistic 
goals for them and their families. In short, rather than tinkering with the 
machinery of the child-welfare system,13 we should work to build a different 
machine. 
II 
A SEA CHANGE IN DETERMINACY 
A. Mnookin’s Critique 
In Child-Custody Adjudication, Mnookin compared litigation in two 
contexts: the child-welfare system and private disputes between parents. He 
argued that in both situations the best-interests standard was indeterminate 
because decisionmakers cannot make accurate predictions about what is best 
for any particular child,14 and, even if they could, there is no societal consensus 
about what is best for children.15 In the child-welfare system, Mnookin 
contended that this indeterminacy had two significant ramifications. 
First, the indeterminate best-interests standard did not consistently identify 
which cases required foster-care placement. As Mnookin explained, in cases 
where the court found that a child has been subject to, or is at risk for, 
maltreatment, the question for the court was whether to remove the child or 
keep her at home.16 At the time Mnookin was writing, most states used the best-
interests standard to make this decision or, in an even more profoundly 
indeterminate manner, simply left the issue to the discretion of the judge.17 
Mnookin argued that rather than enforcing minimum standards of 
acceptable parenting, the best-interests standard invited state actors to look 
 
 13.  Cf. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”). 
 14.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 249–60. 
 15.  Id. at 260–61. As Mnookin stated, “Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less 
ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself.” Id. at 260. 
 16.  See id. at 243 & n.80 (describing how the “jurisdictional” phase of a child-welfare case, when 
the court determined maltreatment, posed no real hurdle to state involvement, and that the main issue 
was in the “dispositional” phase, when the court decided what to do with the family).  
 17.  See id. at 243 n.81 (citing each state’s standard at the time).  
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broadly into a family’s life,18 allowing a judge to use her personal values when 
reviewing a case and opening the door to class bias.19 Further, Mnookin 
believed the indeterminate standard was biased in favor of removal because a 
court weighed the known dangers of the family against the unknown and 
arguably unappreciated dangers of foster care.20 Finally, the best-interests 
standard did not require a decisionmaker to determine whether the child could 
be protected through preventive services to the family rather than removal to 
foster care.21 In all these ways, Mnookin contended that the standard did not 
accurately identify those children truly in need of foster-care placement. 
Second, Mnookin argued that by consigning children to foster care, which 
has numerous risks, the standard did not speed children toward a permanent 
home, either back with their families or in a new adoptive family.22 Instead, 
children moved from one foster-care placement to another, remaining in foster 
care for years.23 Mnookin believed that the indeterminate standard was part of 
the problem because the standard did not require state actors to evaluate 
whether a foster-care placement was serving an individual child’s interests.24 
Decisionmakers could simply cite broad reasons for their decisions, which often 
were not grounded in a particularized determination of a child’s situation.25 
As part of his research, Mnookin sent observers to the annual reviews 
required under California state law.26 Two-thirds of the hearings lasted for two 
minutes or less, and only six percent lasted longer than ten minutes.27 
Additionally, written reports submitted by social workers were simply a recital 
of what had happened since the last review and did not include a detailed action 
plan for the child.28 Mnookin was most struck by the failure of the reviews to 
push the case in a particular direction, either returning the child home or 
moving toward adoption. In most cases, the court simply decided to continue 
 
 18.  Id. at 268–69.  
 19.  Id. at 269–70. Mnookin reviewed cases where this had occurred. Id. at 269 n.194. 
 20.  Id. at 270. Mnookin identified three ways foster care could psychologically damage a child: the 
removal itself, the placement in a home where the child’s status was uncertain and unfamiliar, and the 
high turnover of social workers and judges in the case. Id. at 270–71. Mnookin also noted that there 
were methodological difficulties with gauging whether foster care harms or benefits children in general, 
and also that there was no reliable way for a judge to make this determination with respect to any given 
child. Id. at 271–72. 
 21.  See id. at 272. As Mnookin described, many families could be well served with targeted 
support that addressed the problems in the family, but the state is not required to provide these 
services, and in many instances there is no attempt by the state to help keep families together. Id. 
 22.  Id. at 273. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 273–74. 
 26.  Id. at 274 (describing the annual reviews for each child in foster care, which were intended to 
look back at what had happened to the child during the year and look forward to the plans that were 
being made for the future). The study involved an observation of every annual review in one county 
during a one-month period, a total of 177 cases. Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  See id. Few parents and even fewer foster parents attended the proceedings. Id. 
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care.29 
Unlike private-custody disputes, where Mnookin concluded that there was 
no opportunity for meaningful reform,30 it was possible to address some of the 
problems in the child-welfare system, Mnookin believed, by reforming the best-
interests standard. His two-part reform was intended to limit the number of 
children entering foster care and to move those children who did enter the 
system more quickly, either back to their biological families or into adoptive 
homes.31 
To limit the number of children entering foster care and ensure greater 
consistency, Mnookin proposed to cabin judicial discretion by making the 
standard both more objective and more determinate. He argued for a clearer 
formulation of the removal standard: 
A state may remove a child from parental custody without parental consent only if the 
state first proves: (a) there is an immediate and substantial danger to the child’s 
health; and (b) there are no reasonable means acceptable to the parents by which the 
state can protect the child’s health without removing the child from parental custody.
32
 
Mnookin believed that this reform would lead to far fewer removals because 
differences in values, for example those that might be based on parents’ unusual 
sexual practices, would not enter the decisional framework,33 and the provision 
of services, such as housecleaning for the dirty-home cases,34 would enable 
children to remain in their homes.35 The focus on threats to health would also 
narrow the scope of removal cases to those where intervention was most likely 
 
 29.  Id. at 275. Mnookin also described the problems with the adoption system. He studied the 
adoption process in California and concluded that social workers were reluctant to push for adoption 
and, instead, pursued adoption only where biological parents were largely out of the picture and thus 
would not contest the adoption. Id. at 275–76. Additionally, when adption was pursued, it was usually 
not the product of a push by social workers; rather, it was usually the result of external pressure, such as 
the request by a foster family to adopt the child. Id. at 276. Mnookin concluded that the reticence to 
pursue adoptions was due largely to social workers’ preference for the status quo. Id. 
  More broadly, Mnookin argued that protecting children raises a series of difficult public-policy 
questions, such as determing when the state should try to encourage the formation of new psychological 
ties for a child rather than seek to return the child home, when the state should consider termination of 
parental rights and adoption, and who should make these decisions and using what criteria. Id. at 280. 
Mnookin believed that a flexible, discretionary, and indeterminate standard, such as the best-interests 
test, did not force courts or the child-welfare bureaucracy to answer these questions systematically. Id. 
 30.  See id. at 282. 
 31.  See id. at 277–81.   
 32.  Id. at 278. 
 33.  See id.  
 34.  JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 125 (1998) (describing the different 
kinds of cases in the child-welfare system and noting that approximately fifty percent of cases involve 
poverty-related neglect, such as inadequate child care or dirty homes). 
 35.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 278. Mnookin acknowledged that his standard did not clarify how 
far a state must go to try to keep a child in her home. By asking the state to deploy “reasonable” means 
to keep the child at home, for example, the standard necessarily allows the court to consider the cost of 
the efforts required. Id. at 279. Mnookin was clear, however, that one goal of the standard was to 
encourage states to invest more money in efforts to keep children safe in their own homes. Id. at 279 
n.224. 
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to protect the child.36 He acknowledged that trial judges would still have 
considerable discretion to determine when a danger was “immediate and 
substantial,” but at least the standard would lead to fewer cases of removal.37 
To move children more quickly through the foster-care system after 
removal, Mnookin sought a standard that would maximize continuity and 
stability for the child. He thus proposed a fixed period of time for returning a 
child home from foster care.38 During this time, the state would make 
“reasonable efforts” to work with the parents and create a safe environment for 
the return of the child.39 If, at the end of that period, the child could not safely 
return home, the presumption would shift from reuniting a child with her 
biological family to finding an adoptive home or another long-term, stable 
placement.40 The length of time might depend on the kinds of issues facing the 
family, but the period would be determined at the outset, when the child was 
removed from the home, and would be set using criteria that could be 
consistently and fairly employed in other cases.41 Further, at the time of 
removal, the state would need to detail for the court the kinds of services it 
would offer to the parents to address the problems that led to the removal.42 
Periodic reviews would ensure the state was doing what it could to help parents, 
and, importantly, place the burden on the state to show why the child could not 
safely return home.43 Mnookin acknowledged the problems with a fixed 
period—it might end too soon from the perspective of some parents, or too late 
from the perspective of some children—but argued it would be preferable to 
the indeterminate best-interests standard, which permitted repeated extensions 
even when a child was unlikely ever to return home.44 
B. Congressional Responses to Indeterminacy 
These criticisms by Mnookin and others were highly influential, contributing 
to an overhaul of the child-welfare system in 1980.45 In the Adoption Assistance 
 
 36.  Id. at 278. Mnookin distinguished physical dangers to a child—which, he argued, would likely 
be addressed by placement in foster care—from emotional dangers. It is more difficult to predict when 
a child is emotionally endangered and there is no evidence that foster care would be an improvement 
over a home situation. For this reason, he thought dangers to a child’s “health” should be limited to 
physical dangers. Id. at 279–80.  
 37.  Id. at 278.  
 38.  Id. at 280. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. at 280–81. 
 44.  Id. at 280, 292–93. 
 45.  For a summary of this history, see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 187–88 (2005) [hereinafter GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS] (describing the widespread discontent with the foster-care system and particularly the 
perception that too many children were removed from their homes and were staying in foster care too 
long). See also Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What To Do About It: Is the 
Problem that Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or that Too Many 
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and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),46 Congress took several steps, many 
of which reflected Mnookin’s critique of the system. In a sea change from prior 
policy, which emphasized removal and extended foster-care stays, two stated 
goals of AACWA were avoiding removal by keeping children safe in their 
homes47 and returning children to their families from foster care.48 
AACWA did not adopt Mnookin’s more determinate standard that no child 
should be removed if there are reasonable means to keep the child safely at 
home, but Congress did take a step in that direction. AACWA required states, 
as a condition of receiving federal child-welfare funds, to allow the removal of 
children only where “the removal from the home was the result of a judicial 
determination . . . that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of 
such child and . . . that reasonable efforts” to keep the child in the home had 
been made.49 AACWA’s standard thus only required the provision of services, 
and indeterminate language—“contrary to the welfare of the child”—remained 
at the heart of the inquiry. Even so, the new standard did emphasize the 
importance of family-preservation efforts. 
Crucially, AACWA changed the funding structure for foster care. Rather 
than reimbursing states only for the cost of foster care, which created an 
incentive for removal, AACWA authorized funds for “preservation services,” 
intended to prevent the removal of children, and “reunification services,” 
intended to speed the return of children back to their homes.50 (Subsequent 
legislation, the Family Preservation and Family Support Act of 1993, authorized 
additional funding for these services as well as broader “family support” efforts, 
which are intended to keep families out of the child welfare system entirely.51) 
Other aspects of AACWA were consistent with Mnookin’s recommendations 
as well, such as the requirement that states develop a system for tracking 
children and reviewing their placement goals.52 
 
Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 J. CONST. L. 141, 141 (1999) (describing the Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), as a response to the critique of the foster-care system by Mnookin and 
others).  
 46.  Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 47.  42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C) (2000) (“preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their 
families by identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing 
breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible”). 
 48.  Id. § 625(a)(1)(D) (“restoring to their families children who have been removed, by the 
provision of services to the child and the families”). 
 49.  Id. § 672(a)(1); see also id. § 671(a)(15) (requiring states, as a condition of receiving funding, to 
ensure that in each case, “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and unify families—(i) prior to 
the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from 
his home; and (ii) to make it possible for the child to return to his home”). 
 50.  Id. at §§ 670–676. 
 51.  Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13711, 107 Stat. 649, 649 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629 (1994)), 
 52.  See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (2000) (requiring states, as a condition of receiving funding, to 
“provide[] for the development of a case plan . . . for each child receiving foster care maintenance 
payments under the State plan and provide[] for a case review system . . . with respect to each such 
child”); see also id. § 675(5)(C) (1994) (requiring reviews by an administrative or judicial body “no later 
than eighteen months after the original placement (and periodically thereafter during the continuation 
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The promises of AACWA, however, never materialized. Instead, the foster-
care population soared through the 1980s and 1990s, with more children 
entering foster care, staying longer, and experiencing multiple placements.53 
There are numerous explanations for these trends, including the increasing use 
of crack cocaine in low-income neighborhoods and the failure of Congress to 
authorize, and states to provide, sufficient funds for preservation and 
reunification services, despite changes to the funding structure of foster care 
intended to promote alternatives to removal.54 Indeed, studies from the late 
1980s found that states often did not in fact provide preservation services,55 and 
that courts either ignored this requirement or simply rubber-stamped the state’s 
assertion that it had provided services.56 
The increases in placement and the extended stays in foster care set the 
stage for the next major wave of foster-care reform. In 1997, Congress enacted 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA),57 which dramatically altered the 
child-welfare landscape. Both Congress and the Clinton administration had 
found that the child-welfare system was not serving the interests of children 
because family-preservation efforts were keeping some children in dangerous 
homes, the problem of “foster care drift,” (the term used to describe both long 
stays in foster care and placement in multiple homes) was getting worse, and 
children would be better served by promoting adoption rather than family 
preservation.58 Congress thus sought to move children to permanent homes 
more quickly and to make child safety, rather than family preservation, the 
paramount concern of the child-welfare system.59 
 
of foster care)”). 
 53.  See STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., 2012 GREEN BOOK: 
BACKGROUND DATA AND MATERIAL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS tbl.11-4 (2012) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK], available at 
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/2012/CW%2
0Table11-4_FC-Entering_Served_Exiting_Incare_82-11%20RM-ES.pdf (tracking foster-care rates); 
GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 188. 
 54.  See GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 188–89 
(describing these explanations, and noting that although AACWA authorized funds for preservation 
and reunification services, Congress never allocated the funds, or at least not sufficient funds; further 
noting that “[b]etween 1981 and 1983, federal foster care spending grew by more than 400 percent in 
real terms, while preventive and reunification spending grew by only 14 percent”).  
 55.  See, e.g., MARY ANN JONES, PARENTAL LACK OF SUPERVISION: NATURE AND 
CONSEQUENCE OF A MAJOR CHILD NEGLECT PROBLEM 29, 64 (1987) (finding that in fifty-two 
percent of cases, the most pressing need was day care or babysitting, but that the state typically offered 
foster care rather than child care). 
 56.  NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS: 
STEPS FOR KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER 8 (1987) (finding that numerous judges “remain unaware of 
their obligation to determine if reasonable efforts to preserve families were made,” and that even when 
the court did make such inquiries, judges “routinely ‘rubber stamp[ed]’ assertions by social service 
agencies” that such services had been offered). 
 57.  Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 58.  See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 646–50 (1999).  
 59.  ASFA conditioned federal funds on states developing a foster-care and adoption-assistance 
plan in which “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) 
8_HUNTINGTON_EIC (RECOVERED)_JCI (3) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2014  10:37 AM 
No. 1 2014] THE LIMITS OF DETERMINACY 229 
The centerpiece of ASFA was a determinate standard that set a time limit 
on family-reunification efforts, much as Mnookin had advocated. The time limit 
was not tailored to individual families, as Mnookin proposed, but it was clear 
cut: As a condition of receiving federal funds, states had to commence 
proceedings to terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster 
care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.60 Congress also required 
states to conduct a permanency hearing within twelve months (shortened from 
eighteen months) of a child entering foster care,61 and created greater incentives 
for adoption by giving subsidies to adoptive families.62 ASFA established three 
permissible exceptions to the time limit: the child is living with a relative, the 
state provides a compelling reason for not seeking termination of parental 
rights, or the state has not make “reasonable efforts” to work with the family to 
return the child home.63 
Additionally, ASFA broadened the focus of existing family-preservation 
funding, which diluted the focus on family preservation and reunification. 
Calling the new program Promoting Safe and Stable Families, Congress 
expanded the scope of the funding stream to include services to promote and 
support adoption and adoptive families.64 
C. State Legislation 
States responded to these congressional conditions on federal funding by 
adopting some version of the family-preservation and time-limit requirements. 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia now require their child-welfare 
agencies to provide preservation services, although states typically do not 
specify what kinds of services a family is entitled to receive.65 Arizona, for 
example, simply requires its child-welfare agency “to promote the well-being of 
the child in a permanent home and to coordinate services to strengthen the 
 
(2006). There were other goals as well, including a focus on child well-being and improving innovation 
and accountability. See generally Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families 
Act (ASFA), in URBAN INST., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A 
LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 8, 16–17 (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351_safe_families_act.pdf.  
 60.  42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). Additionally, the state must file for termination of parental 
rights without seeking to preserve the family in other specified circumstances, for example, where (1) 
the parent has subjected the child to certain aggravating circumstances, including abandonment, 
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse; (2) the parent has murdered another child; or (3) the parent’s 
rights have been involuntarily terminated with respect to another child. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii). 
 61.  Id. § 675(5)(C). 
 62.  Id. § 673b. 
 63.  Id. § 675(5)(E). 
 64.  Id. § 629b(a)(4)–(5). The two existing service areas—family preservation and family 
reunification—remained. 
 65.  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR 
CHILDREN: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/ 
laws_policies/statutes/reunify.pdf (listing statutes). 
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family.”66 Other jurisdictions provide somewhat more detailed guidance, such as 
the District of Columbia, which defines family-preservation services to include 
“[r]espite care services,” and “services designed to improve parenting skills and 
abilities.”67 Illinois defines “family preservation services” to include 
homemakers, counseling, family therapy, group therapy, self-help groups, drug 
and alcohol abuse counseling, vocational counseling, and postadoptive 
services.68 
No state, however, has adopted Mnookin’s stringent removal standard: 
conditioning removal on a showing that there are “no reasonable means” to 
keep the child at home.69 Instead, all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
continue to use some variant of the best-interests standard to determine 
whether to place a child in foster care.70 States often list overarching goals to 
inform the standard, such as the preference for avoiding removal,71 or protecting 
the health and safety of the child,72 but only twenty-one states and the District 
of Columbia list specific factors that courts must consider.73 The remaining 
twenty-nine states simply give general guidance,74 stating, for example, that 
courts should “remove the child from the custody of his or her parent or parents 
only when it is judicially determined to be in his or her best interests or for the 
safety and protection of the public.”75 In this way, despite a greater emphasis on 
family preservation, the underlying removal standard has not changed much 
since 1975 and is not significantly more determinate. 
Turning to the time limit, all states have incorporated ASFA’s time limit, 
either by amending state laws or by incorporating the requirement into 
regulations or administrative policies.76 Thirty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have incorporated ASFA’s three permissible exceptions to the time 
limit: (1) the child is living with a relative, (2) the state provides a compelling 
reason for not seeking the termination, or (3) the state has not make 
 
 66.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-801 (2007). 
 67.  D.C. CODE § 4-1301.02(10) (2001). 
 68.  325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.2 (2008).   
 69.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 278. 
 70.  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2012) [hereinafter 
SUMMARY OF STATE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARDS], available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.pdf (setting forth the state standards).  
 71.  Id. at 2 & n.1 (listing twenty-eight states).  
 72.  Id. at 2 & n.2 (listing nineteen states).  
 73.  Id. at 3. These factors include a consideration of (1) the emotional relationship between the 
child and parents, siblings, and other household members, (2) the ability of the parents to provide a 
safe home and care for the child, (3) the mental and physical health of the parent and the child, and (4) 
the presence of domestic violence in the home. 
 74.  See SUMMARY OF STATE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at 4. 
 75.  ALA. CODE § 12-15-101(b)(2) (2008). 
 76.  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (2013) [hereinafter SUMMARY 
OF STATE GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION], available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (listing all state statutes).  
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“reasonable efforts” to provide the family the services needed to ensure the 
child can return home.77 
In sum, the current legal standards have moved at least partially in the 
direction advocated by Mnookin, most notably with the imposition of a time 
limit for returning a child home. This raises a series of questions: How do these 
changes work in practice? Are families receiving family-preservation services 
and are these services keeping children safe in their homes? And are the time 
limits resulting in shorter stays in foster care and greater permanency for 
children? In part III, I explore these questions. 
III 
DETERMINACY IN PRACTICE 
One important lesson of the reforms of the last few decades is that legal 
standards have moved in the direction that Mnookin sought, but there is still 
considerable discrepancy between what is promised in the laws and what is 
practiced on the ground. States do not fully invest in family-preservation efforts, 
and the efforts that are in place appear to have had little impact on foster-care 
placement rates. By contrast, even with only partial implementation, the time 
limits have moved children more quickly through the system. There are some 
data constraints, largely because the federal government did not begin 
compiling comprehensive statistics until 1998,78 but the statistics set forth below 
paint a vivid picture of the child-welfare system in the wake of legislative 
reform. 
A. Family-Preservation Efforts 
1. In Practice 
There is no requirement that states truly invest in family-preservation 
services,79 and generally they do not. A quick glance at the federal budget 
reveals that the federal funds available for out-of-home placement far exceed 
the federal funds available for family preservation. In fiscal year 2011, Congress 
 
 77.  For the federal statutory exceptions, see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). For the states that 
incorporate these exceptions, see SUMMARY OF STATE GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION, 
supra note 76, at 4. 
 78.  ASFA introduced several reporting mechanisms. This article relies in particular on the 
Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS), which began with fiscal year 
1998. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: 
FINAL ESTIMATES FOR FY 1998 THROUGH FY 2002, at 14 (2006) [hereinafter AFCARS FINAL 
ESTIMATES], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport12.pdf. For a 
discussion of the limitations of the federal data, and particularly the biases that stem from the failure to 
track entry cohorts, see Mark E. Courtney, Barbara Needell & Fred Wulczyn, Unintended 
consequences of the push for accountability: The case of National Child Welfare Performance Standards, 
26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1141, 1146–50 (2004). 
 79.  See 42 U.S.C. § 629b(a)(4) (2006) (requiring states to provide family-preservation services 
along with “community-based family support services, time-limited family reunification services, and 
adoption promotion and support services,” but requiring only “significant portions of . . . expenditures 
for each such program”).  
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allocated $4.4 billion for foster-care services, but only $365 million for family 
services, an amount that is intended to cover family-preservation services, 
community-based family-support services, adoption-promotion and support 
services, and reunification services.80 There are other sources of discretionary 
funds available for states to use for preventive programs, but even adding these 
together, the bulk of federal money is still spent on foster care, not prevention.81 
To appreciate just how limited family-preservation-services funds are, 
consider the experience of California. As one state official has said, two 
pressing challenges facing California’s child-welfare system are that the bulk of 
federal funds are reserved for out-of-home placement rather than services to 
families, and that there is a “[w]oeful lack of [other] funding for prevention, 
early intervention, and post-permanency services.”82 The budget numbers 
demonstrate this reality: California receives $1.9 billion from the federal 
government,83 but eighty-nine percent of this money is for out-of-home 
placement.84 Only four percent is earmarked for family-preservation services 
and other programs designed to keep children out of foster care or help 
children who have left foster care.85 
At the national level, comprehensive assessments of family-preservation 
efforts commissioned by the federal government paint a fairly dismal picture of 
family-preservation services in practice.86 The overarching conclusion of one 
 
 80.  ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ALL-
PURPOSE TABLE — FY 2010–12 (2012) [hereinafter ALL-PURPOSE TABLE], available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/fy2012apt.pdf. The Children’s Bureau, within the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, administers the federal funds available for child 
protection. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DIRECTORY OF PROGRAM SERVICES 15, available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/ 
acf_directory.pdf (describing the work of the Children’s Bureau as providing support and guidance to 
programs that (1) strengthen families and prevent child abuse and neglect, (2) protect children who 
have been abused or neglected, and (3) ensure permanency for children).  
 81.  There are numerous ways to count the prevention funds, and the comparison in the text 
accounts only for mandatory (guaranteed) spending, not discretionary programs. Several funding 
streams could be counted as preservation or, more broadly, prevention programs. But even after 
aggregating these funds, the total amount still falls far short of the amount of money for foster-care 
placement. See ALL-PURPOSE TABLE, supra note 80. 
 82.  FRANK MECCA, CNTY. WELFARE DIRECTORS ASS’N OF CAL., FUNDING CHILD WELFARE 
SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA 31 (2008), available at http://www.cwda.org/downloads/publications/cws/ 
CWSPresentation041408.ppt (further listing three additional challenges:“[o]bsolete and inflexible 
federal funding scheme”; “[h]igh caseloads”; and “[r]eliance on other systems with their own priorities, 
funding limitations, and accountability structures”). 
 83.  Id. at 4.  
 84.  See id. at 5–7 (showing that eighty percent of the funds are from Title IV-E and nine percent 
are from the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, both of which restrict spending to out-of-home 
cases and do not fund prevention services). 
 85.  See id. The remaining seven percent is in a category entitled “other.” Id. at 5. The state 
supplements the federal funds with private funds to bolster prevention and preservation programs. See 
id. at 8. 
 86.  See JAMES BELL ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FAMILY 
PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT (FP/FS) SERVICES IMPLEMENTATION STUDY 26–27 (2003) 
[hereinafter FAMILY PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT STUDY], available at 
http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/gateway/Blob/45860.pdf;jsessionid=CAAA8047B63
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report is that despite AACWA’s promises, the child-welfare system still falls 
short of the goal of keeping children in their homes when possible.87 The report 
found that although there are some quality programs, there are considerable 
challenges in the delivery of services.88 Part of the problem is that of the four 
different program areas—family preservation, community-based support, 
adoption support, and reunification services—many states spend their funds on 
adoption support and family reunification, not family preservation.89 In other 
words, instead of working to keep children from entering foster care, states are 
using the funds to help children exit foster care, often to adoptive homes. 
Additionally, there is considerable resistance to family-preservation efforts 
in agencies, particularly after a high-profile abuse case. Even when child-fatality 
cases had not gone through the family-preservation system, for example, the 
report found there was still a sense among child-welfare agencies that the 
family-preservation mentality was responsible for children’s deaths in such 
abuse cases.90 Finally, the report found that family-preservation programs do 
little to address the multiple and complex problems facing families at risk of 
involvement in the child-welfare system.91 
The choice not to invest in family-preservation services is understandable in 
light of the mixed evidence about the effectiveness of such late-stage 
interventions.92 Family-preservation programs typically aim to prevent foster-
care placement and also to strengthen family functioning and improve child 
safety. There are three basic program models: crisis intervention, home-based 
treatment, and family treatment.93 One well-known crisis-intervention program 
is Homebuilders, which was developed in Washington State in 1974. 
 
74AE785AD3A759AE2A0A1?w=+NATIVE%28%27recno%3D45860%27%29&upp=0&rpp=10&r=
1&m=1; [VOL. A] JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL EVALUATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS: THE META-ANALYSIS (2001), available at 
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/nefsp-vola.pdf; 2 WESTAT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATION OF FAMILY PRESERVATION AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMS: FINAL 
REPORT ch. 1 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/evalfampres94/final/Vol2/index.htm. 
 87.  See FAMILY PRESERVATION AND FAMILY SUPPORT STUDY, supra note 86, at 26–27.  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at xv. 
 90.  Id. at 27–28. 
 91.  Id. at 34. The report identified numerous other challenges, such as a lack of coordination 
between social workers in the family-preservation programs and child-welfare case workers, with the 
latter often unaware of the services provided through federally funded preservation programs. Id. at 
xiv. 
 92.  See WESTAT ET AL., supra note 86, at pt. 1.4 (reviewing studies of program effectiveness and 
finding that in “[s]even of eleven studies . . . the programs did not produce significant overall reductions 
in placement”).  
 93.  Crisis intervention involves intensive work with a family, sometimes as much as twenty hours a 
week, during a four- to six-week period, focusing on the provision of concrete services and counseling. 
Home-based treatment is longer-term work over a period of four to five months, focusing on family 
interaction and drawing on family-systems theory, and it also includes concrete services and counseling. 
Finally, family treatment is less intensive treatment in the home and office and focuses more on 
counseling rather than concrete services; it typically involves ninety-day treatment period followed by 
weekly visits for up to five-and-a-half months. See id. at pts. 1.2 & 1.3.  
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Homebuilders is an intensive program that delivers in-home services to families, 
up to twenty hours a week, immediately following a crisis. The principle of 
Homebuilders is that families, as a result of a crisis and the potential placement 
of a child, will be more willing to change. Caseworkers, handling only one to 
two families at a time, work intensively with the family, offering counseling and 
concrete services for four to six weeks.94 
A national assessment of family-preservation efforts conducted a 
randomized study of three programs based on the Homebuilders model, as well 
as one less intensive but still home-based program.95 The assessment tracked 
foster-care placement, child safety, family functioning, and the closure rate for 
child-welfare cases.96 After following these outcomes for families in the 
experimental and control groups, the evaluators concluded that there was no 
statistically significant difference in foster-care placement between families 
receiving the services and the control group, nor was there a difference in case-
closure rates.97 Additionally, families that received the intensive services did not 
reunify with their children more quickly following a placement.98 Looking at 
child safety, the study found no significant differences in maltreatment rates for 
children in the two groups.99 Family functioning was somewhat higher for the 
families receiving intensive treatment, but these improvements were not 
sustained over time.100 
2. A Limited Effect 
Turning to the statistical impact of family preservation, there is little 
evidence that the introduction of these services since the time Mnookin was 
writing has affected foster-care placement. Looking at three different 
measures—the total number of children in care in the fiscal year, the number of 
children in care on the last day of the fiscal year, and the number of children 
entering care in the fiscal year—the statistics all tell a similar story.101 Rather 
than lowering foster-care placement, the introduction of family-preservation 
efforts in the 1980s is correlated with an increase in foster-care placement, 
which rose steadily through the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a high in the late 
1990s, and then steadily decreased in the 2000s.102 
 
 94.  Id. at pt. 1.1. 
 95.  WESTAT ET AL., supra note 86, at executive summary. The final program offered family 
counseling and services over a twelve-week period, focusing particularly on substance-abuse treatment. 
Id. 
 96.  Id. The control group was not an intervention-free group, but rather was assigned regular 
child-welfare services. Id. at 4; see also id. at tbl.4 (setting forth the difference between the caseworker 
intervention in the intensive family-preservation programs and the control groups, and noting 
substantial differences in the amount and type of caseworker support and intervention).  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See GREEN BOOK, supra note 53.  
 102.  See id. Decreases were uneven across the country, with some states, such as Nevada and Texas, 
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Figure 1: Foster-Care Population, 1982–2011 
 
 
 
Source: GREEN BOOK, supra note 53. 
 
This is not to suggest that the introduction of family-preservation services 
caused the higher rates of foster-care placement. As any student of child 
welfare readily knows, numerous factors affect placement rates, such as the 
well-publicized death of a child known to the child-welfare system.103 
Beyond the politics of the child-welfare system, it is possible that the 
changing foster-care rates are explained, at least partially, by an increase and 
then decrease in rates of child abuse and neglect. The National Incidence Study 
is an effort by the federal government to capture the actual incidence of child 
maltreatment. The study—conducted in 1980, 1986, 1993, and 2006—relies on 
 
experiencing sharp increases during the 2000s. CHILD TRENDS, FOSTER CARE DATA SNAPSHOT 4 
(2011), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Child_Trends_2011_05_31_ 
DS_FosterCare1.pdf. 
 103.  See John Courtney et al., Aggressive Prosecutions Flooding the System, 4 CHILD WELFARE 
WATCH 4, 4 (1999) (documenting a fifty-five percent increase in filings of neglect cases and a fifty-
seven percent increase in filings of abuse cases from 1995 to 1998 in New York City following the well-
publicized death of Elisa Izquierdo, a six-year-old girl who had been subjected to fatal abuse by her 
mother and was known to the child-welfare authorities). 
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interviews with professionals who work with children in a variety of settings,104 
and it sweeps in far more incidents of maltreatment than those investigated by 
the child-welfare system.105 These studies show an increase in child 
maltreatment in the 1980s and 1990s and then a decrease in the 2000s.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104.  See ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH 
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS–4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–4 
(2010) [hereinafter NIS–4], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report_ 
congress_full_pdf_jan2010.pdf (describing the study’s sentinel-survey methodology, which looks far 
beyond the reported cases by surveying community professionals who work with children in a variety of 
settings, from police stations and hospitals to schools and emergency shelters). 
 105.  Of the total number of maltreatment incidents found in the four iterations of the study, only a 
minority were investigated by the child-welfare system: 33 percent, 44 percent, 28 percent, and 32 
percent of the total incidents in 1980, 1986, 1993, and 2006, respectively. See NIS–4, supra note 104, at 
16; ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS–3): REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 7–16 (1996) [hereinafter NIS–3], available at http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/ 
docs/gateway/Blob/13635.pdf?w=+NATIVE%28%27IPDET+PH+IS+%27%27nis-3%27%27%27%29 
&upp=0&rpp=-10&order=+NATIVE%28%27year%2Fdescend%27%29&r=1&m=6. The authors of 
the study could not explain this discrepancy. See NIS–4, supra note 104, at 18 (“Children who do not 
receive a CPS investigation represent an enigma to the study, in that it is not possible to say whether 
sentinels who recognized their maltreatment did not report it to CPS or whether they did report it but 
CPS screened their reports out without an investigation.”). 
 106.  Looking only at the more stringent harm standard for maltreatment (and not the broader 
category of endangerment added with the NIS–2), the overall maltreatment rate was 10.5 incidents per 
1000 children in 1980, 14.8 in 1986, 23.1 in 1993, and then 17.1 in 2006. NIS–4, supra note 104, at 3–4; 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE 
AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 16 (1981) [hereinafter NIS–1], available at 
http://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/gateway/Blob/12686.pdf?w=+NATIVE%28%27IP
DET+PH+IS+%27%27nis-1%27%27%27%29&upp=0&rpp=-
10&order=+NATIVE%28%27year%2Fdescend%27%29&r=1&m=2. The National Incidence Study 
uses a narrow definition of child maltreatment, defined to include incidents where “through the 
purposive acts or marked inattention to the child’s basic needs, behavior of a parent/substitute or other 
adult caretaker caused foreseeable or avoidable injury or impairment to a child or materially 
contributed unreasonable prolongation or worsening of an existing injury or impairment.” See NIS–1, 
supra, at 4. The narrow definition thus does not include acts of a noncaretaker, unless the parent 
“knowingly permitted” the acts or omissions. See id.  
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Figure 2: Child-Maltreatment Rates, 1980–2006 
 
 
Source: NIS–4, supra note 104, at 3–4; NIS–1, supra note 106, at 16. 
 
This increase and then decrease in child-maltreatment follows the same 
trajectory as the foster-care placement rates, raising the possibility that an 
increase in child maltreatment drove the increase in foster care. It is hard to 
confirm this link as a definitive matter, because the relationship between child-
maltreatment rates and foster-care placement is complex,107 but the main point 
 
 107.  A straightforward conclusion—supported by figure 1 and figure 2—is that an increase in child 
maltreatment drove the increase in foster-care involvement. It could also be argued, however, that the 
inverse is true. A change in the child-welfare-investigation policies might have driven up the child-
maltreatment rate because the child-welfare system was more aggressive in identifying and 
investigating cases. This theory might partially explain the increase in child maltreatment between 1980 
and 1986, because both the number of cases investigated by the child-welfare system, and the overall 
proportion of investigated to noninvestigated cases, rose during this time period. See NIS–3, supra note 
105, at 7–16. Between 1986 and 1993, however, the foster-care population was rising but the number of 
children investigated by the child-welfare system remained roughly the same. See id. (explaining that 
the overall number of child-maltreatment incidents rose substantially during this period but that the 
number of incidents investigated by child-welfare authorities in this period remained stable). A third 
explanation, then, is that the kind of maltreatment investigated by the child-welfare system between 
1986 and 1993 was more likely to result in removal and this is why the foster care population increased 
during that period even though there were no more child-welfare investigations. In other words, the 
system did not investigate more cases, but it was more likely to remove children based on what the 
authorities found. At any rate, the point here is not to explain fully the relationship between foster-care 
placement and child-maltreatment rates, but rather to note that family-preservation policies do not 
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is that there is little evidence that AACWA’s emphasis on family preservation 
had a significant impact on foster-care placement or that family-preservation 
efforts sufficiently counteracted other forces pushing children into foster care. 
Rather, the increase and then decrease in the foster-care population is likely 
tied to other factors. 
B. The Time Limit on Reunification Efforts 
1. In Practice 
Turning to Mnookin’s proposal that the law set a time limit on states’ efforts 
to reunite children with their families, ASFA has resulted in some considerable 
changes in practice, although fewer than might be expected. Rather than 
applying the time limit strictly, states are more likely to invoke one of the three 
exceptions to the time limit.108 Indeed, a report from the Government 
Accounting Office found that the number of children subject to the exceptions 
was far greater than the number of children subject to the limit.109 
Despite the repeated invocation of the time-limit exceptions, however, there 
is some evidence that agency culture has changed in response to ASFA, with 
caseworkers and agencies more generally focused on permanency.110 In 
particular, it appears that state agencies are making greater efforts to find 
adoptive homes, even for otherwise hard-to-adopt children, such as children 
with special needs and older children.111 
2. A Substantial Impact 
Even partially implemented, ASFA’s time limit has had a substantial effect 
on speeding children to permanent placements. It is difficult to compare today’s 
system with that of 1975 because the federal statistics were not as thorough in 
the 1970s, but there is evidence that children were in foster care for extended 
periods of time when Mnookin was writing. Mnookin cited a study of foster 
children in San Francisco, for example, which found that the average length of 
time in foster care was five years and that sixty-two percent of the children were 
 
appear to be a strong factor in foster care placement in the 1980s and early 1990s.    
 108.  See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 18–20. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services does not track states’ use of the limit or the exceptions. Id. at 20. Moreover, in a 
phrase that echoes Mnookin’s critique of the best-interests standard, this report also found that 
“[b]ecause the statutory provisions [setting the time limits] allow states discretion in individual cases, it 
is difficult to assess how often states are applying these provisions in their strict form.” See id. at 18. 
(For the content of the three exceptions, see text accompanying supra note 77.) 
 109.  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-585, RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS STATES FOCUS ON 
FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REMAIN 27 (2002), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234761.pdf. The reasons for this vary by state, with some 
states reporting a high number of children living with relatives, others saying they had not provided 
parents needed services, and still others reporting that they were waiting for parents to voluntarily 
relinquish their parental rights. See id. at 27–31. 
 110.  Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 21–24. 
 111.  See id. at 21–22. 
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expected to remain in care until they reached the age of majority.112 
Looking at the impact of ASFA, the law appears to have had a significant 
effect in a number of areas. Beginning with the median stay in foster care, in the 
first year after ASFA was enacted (before the provisions had a chance to take 
effect), the median stay for the children currently in foster care was 20.5 
months.113 By 2011, the median stay in foster care had declined to 13.5 months.114 
 
Figure 3: Median Length of Stay in Foster Care, 1998–2011 
 
 
Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to 
AFCARS Reports 10–20). 
 
 
 
 112.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 275 n.217 (citing unpublished manuscript). 
 113.  See AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 3. This report replaced the data from the 
earlier AFCARS reports. See id. at 14.  
 114.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: 
PRELIMINARY FY 2011 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2012, at 2 (2006) [hereinafter AFCARS FY 2011 
DATA], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf. The mean, 
however, was 23.9 months. Id. Of the children who exited foster care in fiscal year 2011, the median 
stay was 13.2 months. Id. at 3.  
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These shorter stays translate into greater permanency for children. Looking 
at adoption, of the children who exited foster care in 2011, twenty percent were 
adopted,115 as compared with only fifteen percent in 1998.116 Adoption rates, 
however, differ by race. Even though fewer African American children are 
entering foster care today,117 the adoption rates for African American children 
have declined considerably, while the adoption rates of Latino and white 
children have increased.118 
ASFA’s emphasis on adoption has also translated into faster adoptions for 
more children. Of the children adopted in 1998, only sixteen percent had spent 
less than two years in foster care.119 By 2005, twenty-nine percent of the children 
adopted that year had spent less than two years in foster care.120 Additionally, 
the time between the termination of parental rights and adoption has also 
shortened since ASFA, from more than twelve months in 1998121 to 9.7 months 
in 2011.122 
One of the biggest successes in permanency is the increased use of 
guardianships, which allow a child to be placed in the permanent custody of an 
adult without terminating parental rights. In 2011, six percent of all children 
leaving foster care were placed with guardians,123 as compared with only two 
percent in 1998.124 This is a much-needed permanency option for older children 
who may not want to be adopted, and for kinship caregivers who may not want 
 
 115.  AFCARS FY 2011 DATA , supra note 114, at 3 (reporting 49,866 children adopted from foster 
care in fiscal year 2011). This is clearly an improvement in adoption rates as compared with when 
Mnookin was writing. Although there are not as reliable statistics, Mnookin reported there were very 
few adoptions out of the child-welfare system in the 1970s. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 275 n.217 
(citing A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 28 (1973)) (describing a study of the 
foster care population in Massachusetts, which found that children had little chance of being adopted, 
even though the parents of fewer than thirty percent of the children were interested in regaining 
custody; the social workers’ primary reason for not finding adoptive homes was that the parents were 
still interested). 
 116.  AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8 (reporting 38,221 children adopted from 
foster care in fiscal year 1998). Looking at cohorts, it appears that the cohort of children entering foster 
care after ASFA had a greater chance of being adopted than the cohort of children entering foster care 
before ASFA. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 26. 
 117.  See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER 
CARE STATISTICS FY 2011, at 10 (2011) (finding that of the children entering foster care between 2001 
and 2011, the percentage who were African American declined from twenty-eight percent to twenty-
three percent, and that the largest percentage increase was for Latino children). 
 118.  Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 26–27. The national rate of transracial adoptions for 
children in foster care has not increased since ASFA, with African American children still the least 
likely to be adopted by white parents, and Latino children the most likely to be adopted by different-
race parents. See id. at 26. 
 119.  Id. at 28. The period is measured by the length of time between the last removal and a 
finalized adoption. 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 13. 
 122.  See AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 5.  
 123.  Id. at 3.  
 124.  AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8. 
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to adopt.125 One of the reasons for the greater use of guardianships is the 
Fostering Connections to Success Act of 2008,126 which permits states to use 
federal child-welfare funds to subsidize guardianships when the guardian is a 
relative, thus making guardianship a more viable option.127 
C. Assessing Mnookin’s Proposals 
Looking at determinacy on the front end of foster-care placement, there is 
no basis for evaluating Mnookin’s proposed standard because no state adopted 
Mnookin’s stringent standard of removing a child only where (1) there are no 
reasonable means for treating the family with the child still at home, and (2) 
there are threats to a child’s health. If states had taken this approach, perhaps 
the foster-care population would not have skyrocketed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
We simply do not know, and the jury is still out on the effect of a more 
determinate removal standard. 
As the data demonstrate, foster-care placement rates do not seem affected 
by an increased emphasis on family preservation through an indeterminate 
standard. There are several possible explanations for this lack of success—
including differing maltreatment rates, poor study design, and 
underinvestment—but it is also possible that the disconnect between family-
preservation services and placement rates is because family preservation is so 
difficult to achieve in the face of a family crisis. This does not necessarily mean 
more children should be placed in foster care, but rather that we should reassess 
how we can better prevent foster-care placement. 
Turning to determinacy on the back end, when states adopted a determinate 
standard for reunifying a family, and even when this reform was only partially 
implemented, there was a substantial effect on permanency, speeding children 
through the system more quickly and putting many of them in permanent 
homes. It is here that Mnookin’s proposed reform appears to have had the 
greatest effect. It is evidence that a determinate standard, even one with 
considerable exceptions, can produce a sea change in practice. Whether the 
costs of this change are acceptable is the subject of the next part. 
IV 
REFLECTIONS ON DETERMINACY 
With several years experience, the time is ripe to assess the impact of child-
welfare reform and think more broadly about the goals of the child-welfare 
 
 125.  For an overview of this law and its place more generally in the child-welfare system, see 
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 145–48 (2013). Subsidizing 
guardianships also has helped move children out of foster care more quickly, contributing to greater 
permanency. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSIDIZED 
GUARDIANSHIP: CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS, at ii, 18 (2011), available at 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/subsidized.pdf (finding that in some states, subsidized 
guardianship has reduced length of time in foster care twenty-two to forty-three percent). 
 126.  Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified at scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 127.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(28), 673(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
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system. As elaborated below, the relative success of back-end determinacy 
appears to have come at the cost of family reunification. And this tension 
between permanency and reunification is not nearly as stark as it might be with 
full implementation of the time limits. It is also time to reconsider what can be 
done on the front end, to prevent foster-care involvement and, more precisely, 
to lower rates of child maltreatment. 
Given the challenge of late-stage preservation efforts, and the trade-off 
between permanency and family reunification, the real emphasis in the child-
welfare system should be on early-stage prevention, particularly programs that 
address the root causes of child abuse and neglect. For the small number of 
cases that will inevitably end up in the child-welfare system, we need to 
formulate more realistic goals for children and parents based on the 
acknowledgement that some parents will not make the needed changes in their 
lives within the given time frame and that there will not be adoptive homes for 
all children. 
A. The Trade-Off Between Permanency and Reunification 
The flip side of a time limit is that, not surprisingly, fewer children are 
returning to their parents since the enactment of ASFA. In 1998, shortly after 
the enactment of ASFA, sixty percent of the children leaving foster care 
returned home to their parents.128 By contrast, in 2011, only fifty-two percent of 
the children leaving foster care were reunified with their families.129 
  
 
 128.  AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8. 
 129.  AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 3. Reunification rates vary by race, with African 
American children the least likely to return to their families, even accounting for the higher rate of 
kinship placements for African American children. See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 28. In 
other words, African American children in foster care are more likely than children of other races to be 
placed with a relative—placements that are often long-term and that can turn into guardianships—but 
even taking this into account, African American children are less likely to return to the care of their 
parents. See id. 
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Figure 4: Children Exiting Foster Care to Parental Custody, 1998–2011 
 
 
Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to 
AFCARS Reports 10–20). 
 
The shorter time frame allowed for foster-care placement is intended to move 
children quickly to reunification or adoption, but in many cases the expedited 
time line does not allow a parent to make the changes necessary to regain 
custody. This is unsurprising in light of the substantial challenges facing 
parents.130 This decline in reunifications occurred with only partial 
implementation of the time limit, so, presumably, there would be even fewer 
reunifications if states imposed the time limit in more cases than they currently 
 
 130.  See CHERYL SMITHGALL ET AL, PARENTS’ PASTS AND FAMILIES’ FUTURES 27 (2012), 
available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/Parents%20Past%20and%20Families_08_30_ 
12-FINAL.pdf (describing a study of parents with children in the child-welfare system and finding that 
“[t]he comprehensive assessments of these particular parents suggest that they have histories replete 
with childhood trauma; adolescence characterized by substance use, limited educational attainment, 
dysfunctional family paradigms, poor models for romantic relationships, a lack of stable employment, 
and compounded problems in their current functioning (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, domestic 
violence, etc.)”). See generally Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, FUTURE OF CHILD., Winter 2004, 
at 95, available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_05.pdf 
(describing the challenges of reunification). 
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do. 
This lower reunification rate is partly explained by the higher rate of 
adoptions and guardianships. Deciding whether this trade-off between 
permanency and reunification is acceptable is largely a matter of perspective 
and values, but with the introduction of the time limit, the choice is in sharp 
relief. It is tempting to imagine that the trade-off is avoidable and that there are 
means for reunifying families within the tight time frame, but there has been 
very little innovation on this front,131 so there is no evidence for evaluating 
promising programs. Additionally, the return of children into foster care after a 
failed reunification has always been a substantial risk,132 so the answer is not 
necessarily returning children more quickly. 
Even if reasonable minds can disagree about whether more adoptions and 
guardianships and fewer reunifications is an acceptable trade-off, a more 
troubling result of ASFA is that recent statistics show that children are 
increasingly likely to leave foster care through emancipation. In these cases, the 
state determines that the child cannot safely return home but the state also does 
not find an alternative permanent home for the child. When the child reaches 
age eighteen or twenty-one, foster care ends and the child is left with limited 
support from the state.133 The young adults who are emancipated from foster 
care tend to have very poor outcomes, including low educational attainment, 
low earnings, high rates of pregnancy, relatively high rates of homelessness, and 
so on.134 It is troubling, then, that eleven percent of the children leaving foster 
care in 2011 were emancipated,135 as compared with only seven percent in 
1998.136 Although there may be numerous reasons for this increase, the data 
suggest that there are not adoptive homes for all children, particularly older 
children. “Permanency” can be a lonely place. 
  
 
 131.  See Golden & Macomber, supra note 59, at 28.  
 132.  See Wulczyn, supra note 130, at 103–04 (discussing the high failure rate for family 
reunifications, which appears to be decreasing over time, although also noting that this decrease could 
be at least partly because the more recent reunifications have not had a chance to fail). 
 133.  See CLARK M. PETERS ET AL., EXTENDING FOSTER CARE TO AGE 21: WEIGHING THE COSTS 
TO GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE BENEFITS TO YOUTH 1–2 (2009), available at 
www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/Issue_Brief 06_23_09.pdf (describing the different 
state foster-care systems that typically end at age eighteen; further describing a recent federal law 
making funds available for states to extend foster care to age twenty-one).  
 134.  Children Who Age Out of the Foster Care System: Hearing on H.R. 6893 and H.R. 6307 Before 
the Subcomm. on Income Sec. & Family Support of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 75–
76 (2007) (statement of Mark Courtney, Ballmer Chair in Child Well-Being, School of Social Work, 
University of Washington). 
 135.  AFCARS FY 2011 DATA, supra note 114, at 3. 
 136.  AFCARS FINAL ESTIMATES, supra note 78, at 8. 
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Figure 5: Children Exiting Foster Care to Emancipation, 1998–2011 
 
 
Source: See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE STATISTICS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars (follow hyperlinks to 
AFCARS Reports 10–20). 
 
There are ways to tinker with the system, by, for example, developing a 
more flexible time limit, perhaps along the lines suggested by Mnookin—where 
each case would have a predetermined time limit, reflecting the circumstances 
of each family. These particularized determinations would go beyond the three 
exceptions already built into the law. With older children, for example, a longer 
time frame would be permissible. Or if the problem is securing adequate 
housing, rather than treating a recurring substance abuse problem, a longer 
time frame might also make sense. 
But the hard truth is that for many families the math does not favor family 
reunification. The determinate standard exposes this reality. It also forces us to 
rethink the goals and possibilities of the child-welfare system. Rather than 
believe that a shortened time frame truly gives parents a chance to address the 
issues that led to the removal, and rather than wish there were adoptive families 
or guardianships for all children, the system should work much harder and, 
crucially, much earlier to keep children out of foster care altogether. 
B. Building a Different Machine 
At some level, Mnookin’s proposals are thoughtful efforts to fix a broken 
machine. It certainly might be possible to develop a more determinate removal 
standard that states would be willing to adopt, but this will not be easy in light 
of the general resistance among child-welfare agencies to family-preservation 
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efforts.137 Nor is it clear such a standard would affect foster-care placement 
given the unproven record of family-preservation efforts.138 By contrast, the 
determinate reunification standard is successful, but it comes at considerable 
costs.  
Rather than focusing so much attention on families at the brink of a crisis or 
immediately afterwards, we should build a different machine that more directly 
addresses the conditions that lead to child abuse and neglect, particularly 
limited social and financial resources. There will always be some need for a 
child-welfare system, but rather than try so hard to fix the system, we should 
reduce the need for it. 
A promising approach is to strengthen families from the start. There are 
numerous ways to do so,139 but there is a mechanism that is already part of the 
current child-welfare system. One of the permissible expenditures for funds 
from the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act is for “family support 
services.”140 In contrast to family-preservation programs, which are intended for 
specific families facing imminent risk of foster-care placement, family-support 
programs are intended to serve an entire community in order to strengthen 
families to avoid crises.141 These programs offer services such as parenting 
education, social support, case management and referral services, center-based 
early-childhood education, adult education, and so on.142 With the exception of 
center-based early-childhood education, most of the programs work with 
parents rather than directly with children, reflecting the belief that helping 
parents helps children.143 
There is considerable evidence that these efforts are effective at avoiding 
family breakdown. In a national assessment commissioned by the federal 
government, evaluators conducted a meta-analysis of 665 studies of 260 
different family-support programs around the country.144 The assessment found 
that the programs made measurable improvements for children’s cognitive 
development, children’s social and emotional development, parenting attitudes 
and knowledge, parenting behavior, and family functioning.145 Many of the 
 
 137.  See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 138.  See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 139.  Indeed, this is the subject of my recent book, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW 
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014). 
 140.  42 U.S.C. § 629 (2006). 
 141.  JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., supra note 86, at ii. Both family-preservation services and family-
support programs are funded through the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-133, 115 Stat. 2413 (2002).  
 142.  JEAN I. LAYZER ET AL., supra note 86, at A5-1. 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. at A2-7. 
 145.  See id. at A5-2 to -9. The assessment tracked four child outcomes (cognitive development and 
school performance, social and emotional development, health, and safety) and five parent outcomes 
(parent attitudes and knowledge, parenting behavior, family functioning, parental mental health and 
health-risk behaviors, and economic well-being). For the other child and parent outcomes, there were 
also statistically significant improvements, but the meaning of the differences was less clear and thus 
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programs did not track child maltreatment specifically,146 but the improvement 
in family functioning and parenting skills is some evidence that these programs 
can prevent child abuse and neglect. 
I have written at length elsewhere about the value of broad-based 
prevention programs.147 The point here is not to describe these programs and 
their benefits in detail, but rather to argue that there is another way to improve 
outcomes for children. Prevention can work, but it requires considerable 
investment in family functioning. Given the enormous direct costs of the current 
system—$29.4 billion in 2010148—this is not necessarily a matter of new 
investments, but rather shifting the focus from a reactive child-welfare system 
toward a system that nurtures family functioning early on, long before a family 
maltreats a child. This approach differs from family preservation because it 
does not begin work when a family reaches a crisis. Instead, the work starts at 
the point of family formation, seeking to strengthen the family to avoid a crisis 
entirely. This new approach should not be part of the child-welfare system at all 
but instead integrated into broader policies about children and families. 
A preventive approach to child well-being is both better for children and 
more cost-effective,149 but transitioning away from the current reactive approach 
will not be easy culturally, politically, or fiscally.150 Consider, for example, the 
funding challenges. Saving substantial amounts of money over the long run is 
appealing, but funding streams are baroque. Investments made by one segment 
of the government (a health department providing prenatal care, for example), 
may be realized by another (the education system), but when budgets are in 
silos, there is little incentive for one institution to make investments that 
another institution will realize. This is difficult within any one level of 
government—say, at the local or state level—but the problem is even more 
difficult in our federalist system. When a state government invests in early-
childhood education, expenditures may result in fewer welfare applicants down 
the road, but the savings will be reaped, at least in part, by the federal 
government. This is not an easy problem to solve, but it does clarify the need to 
think about costs and benefits more holistically and to create a funding scheme 
 
the researchers were wary about attributing the differences to the programs. See id. at A5-2 to -3. 
 146.  See id. at A5-24. 
 147.  See Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 
1531–34 (2007) [hereinafter Huntington, Mutual Dependency]; Clare Huntington, Neuroscience and the 
Child Welfare System, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 37 (2012); Clare Huntington, Purple Haze, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
903, 913–14 (2011) (reviewing NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: 
LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010)). 
 148.   GREEN BOOK, supra note 53, at ch. 11, available at 
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2012-green-book/chapter-11-child-welfare/introduction-
and-overview (providing statistics for state fiscal year 2010). A little more than half the money came 
from state and local sources and the remainder from the federal government. See id. (reporting that 
$15.8 billion, or fifty-four percent of the total, was from state and local sources and that $13.6 billion, or 
forty-six percent of the total, was from the federal government).  
 149.  See Huntington, Mutual Dependency, supra note 147.  
 150.  I address all these issues in my book, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 139.  
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that provides the correct incentives to invest in family relationships. 
Another challenge is that unlike the federal government, which can legally 
run a deficit, state and local governments are often required by law to balance 
their budgets every year.151 For this reason, a program that requires an outlay 
today but provides a return only in the future simply may not be possible. There 
is no way around this problem of a delayed return on investment and this is a 
reason why centralized federal funding, even if it devolves control to states and 
localities, is essential. 
Even with an effective prevention program in place, there will still be some 
need for foster care. In these cases, it is essential to develop more realistic goals 
for children and parents. This means accepting the dual reality that many 
parents cannot turn their lives around in a short period, and that there is not an 
adoptive home for every child. One promising way forward is to expand 
guardianships. As described above,152 guardianship is an excellent option for 
older children and children in care with relatives because it provides a 
permanent home for the child without terminating parental rights. 
Guardianship programs recognize that family members’ lives are complex and 
that a child and parent often maintain a connection even though it is 
inappropriate to return the child to the parent’s custody. There is room for 
much innovation on this front, and guardianships may be a way around the 
unforgiving math of the current legal framework. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Mnookin was right to focus on determinacy. Many of the problems in the 
child-welfare system in both 1975 and today stem from unclear standards about 
when the state can remove a child and what the state should do with a family 
afterwards. But even with substantial efforts to increase determinacy, the child-
welfare system still too often fails to serve families well. Children may be 
spending less time in foster care, but they endure the trauma of removal. And 
too many children are never finding a home, either with their original or a new 
family. The real challenge then is to strengthen families long before a crisis. 
Increasingly, we are learning that this is possible. It will take money and effort, 
but it will be well worth the investment. 
 
 
 151.  See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. II, § 24. 
 152.  See supra text accompanying notes 123–127. 
